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EFFECTS OF COMPETITION AND CHANGES
IN ROUTE STRUCTURE ON GROWTH
OF DOMESTIC AIR TRAVEL
By HERBERT H. WHITEHEAD
Senior Economic Analyst, since 1939, American Airlines, Inc.
B.S. 1913, Iowa State College. Formerly, Statistician for City of
Oklahoma City.
N appearances before the Civil Aeronautics Board, many applicants
and civic bodies claimed that the addition of competitive carriers
on a route caused large increases in air travel. Also, they claimed that
astronomical growth of air travel followed certification and operation
of one-carrier service on routes formerly served by the connecting serv-
ice of two or more carriers. These claims were based on comparisons
of prewar and postwar travel taken from surveys of the Civil Aeronau-
tics Board. American Airlines questioned the validity of many such
claims, since they were based upon selected statistics, that did not show
average growth tendencies of the industry.
American Airlines, therefore, decided to make a study of prewar
and postwar air travel using a sample that would be broad enough to
show true growth tendencies. In this sample, all of the travel was clas-
sified so as to isolate the effects of added competition and institution of
one-carrier service for the first time. It was found that these factors
affected growth of air travel to only a small extent, far less than has
generally been claimed. It was found that other factors, not so gener-
ally recognized, caused a large part of the growth of air travel that was
credited to competition and substitution of one-carrier service.
In order to determine, separately, the effect on travel growth of
competitive and one-carrier service, the air travel between city-pairs
was classified, and average rates of growth from the prewar to the post-
war period of groups with similar travel content were compared. The
effect of extraneous factors, such as growth of national income, was
minimized, since they affected all groups to the same extent. The
travel between city-pairs was divided into five classifications.
1. City-pairs between which "first one-carrier" service was author-
ized in the postwar period, but which had received connecting
service by two or more carriers prewar.
2. City-pairs between which "connecting-only" service was pro-
vided in both periods.
3. City-pairs between which one-carrier service was provided in
the prewar period, but which received competitive service from
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one or more additional carriers postwar; these were termed
"competition-added."
4. City-pairs between which the same single carrier provided serv-
ice in both periods; these were termed "same one carrier."
5. City-pairs between which the same two or more competing car-
riers provided through service in both periods; these were
termed "same competitive."
In order to classify travel as competitive or one-carrier, the follow-
ing rules were used:
1. An airline must have carried 20 per cent as much traffic as the
leading carrier in order to be classified as a competitor. Intent
was to show real competitive impacts, not potential competition.'
2. One-carrier service must have been used by at least 20 percent
of the travel between city-pairs; otherwise the segment was classi-
fied as "connecting-only," since connecting carriers obviously pro-
vided the essential service. The 20 per cent rule was applied to
prewar and postwar travel.
3. Interchange travel was considered as one-carrier travel between
city-pairs where one-plane service was provided, since very little
difference was found in rates of growth.
2
4. If another carrier, because of its changed route structure, cap-
tured over 80 per cent of the travel formerly carried by a carrier
with a more circuitous route, it was classified as "first one-carrier"
travel.
THE SAMPLE
It was recognized that the size of the sample was important, if the
survey was to be unbiased. For this reason, the survey covered all
traffic to and from the first ten 3 traffic markets of the nation, which
were New York/Newark, Chicago, Los Angeles/Long Beach, San
Francisco/Oakland, Washington, Detroit, Boston, Miami, Dallas/Fort
Worth and Seattle. September 1940 travel was compared with Sep-
tember 1948 travel for all cities except Miami, for which March 1941
and March 1949 travel was compared, for seasonal reasons.4  This sam-
ple represented over 35 percent of the nation's domestic airline travel.
City-pairs with travel from 60 to 6000 postwar passengers per
month were included, unless the prewar volume of travel was less than
five per month. Inclusion of segments with more than 6000 passengers
per month would have greatly distorted averages, and therefore tended
' See Appendix III for 17 additional segments where competition penetrated
as low as 10 percent. Reclassification would have made no material difference in
the results of this survey.
2 The interchanges considered were: United-Western interchange in Sep-
tember 1940, and Trans World-Delta interchange in September 1948 and March
1949.
3Based on Passenger Miles.
4 Data from last prewar surveys by Civil Aeronautics Board is compared
with Board's last published postwar surveys. September was ordinarily the larg-
est travel month for most U. S. cities, but for Miami, March was much larger
and more comparable.
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to hide the growth characteristics of the many smaller segments.'
City-pairs with less than 5 prewar passengers were regarded as too
immature to consider; nevertheless, their inclusion would have made
no material change in results of this survey." City-pairs less than 150
miles apart were eliminated, except four city-pairs separated by natural
barriers, which were retained, since ground travel required far more
than 150 miles.7 In a few instances, travel of two adjacent cities was
combined. To have considered travel from each separately would
have distorted the survey, since the proximity of the airports allowed
their alternate use.8
COMPARISON OF RATES OF GROWTH
I. Effect of "First One-Carrier" Service
In order to measure the effect on travel growth of the substitution
of "first one-carrier" service for "connecting-only" service, a compari-
son was made of the growth experienced by the city-pairs receiving
each type of service. This comparison showed that first one-carrier
service stimulated the average rate of growth to only a limited extent.
Average Growth
Number of Passengers Ratio-Postwar
Travel Classification City-Pairs Prewar Postwar to Prewar
First one-carrier 155 8,014 60,775 7.58
Connecting-only 57 1,456 9,818 6.74
Travel on 155 segments receiving one-carrier service for the first
time in the postwar period was 7.58 times greater than prewar; how-
ever, travel on 57 segments receiving connecting-only service was 6.74
times greater. A comparison of the relative rates of growth showed
that the first one-carrier travel grew only 12.5 percent faster than con-
necting-only travel.
As compared with the extravagant claims, it appeared that the stim-
ulating power of one-carrier service was overrated, and that the devel-
opment of connecting travel was greatly underrated. Many carriers
were eager to provide effective connecting service, and the public
patronized it well. The quality and convenience of well-coordinated,
end-to-end connecting service, operated with the finest planes and with
few stops was not generally appreciated by such claimants.
2. Effect of Added Competition
The effect of added competition on travel growth was measured by
comparing average growth of segments, where competition was added
in the postwar period, with that between city-pairs which continued to
receive service from a single carrier in both periods. This comparison
5 See Appendix III-B.
6 See Appendix III-A.
7 City-pairs included and their railroad mileages were:
Chicago-Muskegon 193 Detroit-Akron 231
Chicago-Grand Rapids 184 Washington-Norfolk 224
8 Buffalo-Niagara Falls, Tampa-St. Petersburg, and Hartford-Springfield.
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indicated that the addition of service by competing carrier had very lit-
tle effect on the rate of growth of air travel.
Average Growth
Number of Passengers Ratio-Postwar
Travel Classification City-Pairs Prewar Postwar to Prewar
Competition added 92 26,414 118,198 4.47
Same one-carrier 267 38,871 168,880 4.34
Travel on 92 segments, where competition was added, was 4.47
times greater in the postwar period, but travel on 267 segments served
by a single carrier was 4.34 times greater. The difference in average
rates of growth was only 3 percent, a comparatively minor difference.
This comparison, showing the small increase in growth following the
certification of competing carriers, reveals that such certification
merely results in the distribution of normal traffic among more car-
riers. As a matter of fact, on some routes, where traffic volumes were
small, adding competition caused all carriers to experience difficulty in
operating profitably. The Civil Aeronautics Board has recognized this
problem on some routes and has initiated investigations.9
3. Effect of Unchanged Competition
The last comparison showed that travel on segments served by com-
petitive carriers in both periods did not grow as rapidly as travel be-
tween city-pairs served by a single carrier. This statistical finding was
completely contrary to claims of those who have supported the proposi-
tion that competition has acted as a tremendous and continuous spur to
travel growth.
Average Growth
Number of Passengers Ratio-Postwar
Travel Classification City-Pairs Prewar Postwar to Prewar
Same competition 18 9,079 30,382 3.35
Same one-carrier 267 38,871 168,880 4.34
Travel on 18 segments given one-carrier service by competing car-
riers was only 3.35 times greater in the postwar period. This growth
rate was 23 percent less than that of travel between 267 segments served
by a single carrier in both periods. Travel on these latter segments
was 4.34 times greater in the postwar period.
The sample indicated that competition did not provide any contin-
uous stimulating effect.
OTHER FACTORS AFFECTING TRAVEL GROWTH
Since competition and changes'in route structure had only a minor
influence on domestic air travel growth, further examination of the
data was made in order to determine what factors did affect growth. It
was found that several other factors had considerably more effect, but
that an examination of individual city-pairs was required if their
9 Routes under investigation are those between Chicago and Washington(Docket No. 3660), between Twin Cities, Detroit and Washington (Docket No.
8661), and between New York and Detroit (Docket No. 3662).
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growth characteristics were to be understood. The most important
factors which aided or hindered growth are treated below.
1. Volume of Travel Between City-Pairs
Travel between city-pairs was classified by postwar intercity volume
in order to determine whether a relationship existed between the size
of segment and the rate of growth. The sample showed:
Average Growth
Postwar Travel Volume Number of Postwar Ratio-Postwar
Per Month Between City-Pairs City-Pairs Travel to Prewar
60 to 300 passengers 316 11.8% 5.02
301 to 600 passengers 104 11.6% 5.24
601 to 1500 passengers 97 23.5% 4.82
1501 to 6000 passengers 72 53.1% 4.36
589 100.0% 4.63
Included in the 316 city-pairs in the 60 to 300 volume group were
the only four city-pairs experiencing a negative growth. Inclusion of
these pairs pulled down the group average from 5.36 to 5.02 which was
below that of the 301-600 volume group. 10 Taking this factor into
consideration, the table indicated that there existed an inverse relation-
ship between volume and growth. The larger the travel volume, the
slower was the rate of growth.
This trend was set by the competition-added travel, the same one-
carrier travel, and the same-competitive travel, which constituted 82
percent of the travel in the sample, although constituting only 64 per-
cent of the number of city-pairs. 1
This inverse trend can be explained. During prewar years, carriers
emphasized development between larger cities. Postwar, more atten-
tion was given to travel between smaller cities and larger travel in-
creases resulted.
This study is of further interest in that it showed the effects of com-
petition on different volumes of travel.
Competition Added Same One-Carrier
Postwar Travel City- Growth City- Growth
Volume per Month Pairs Ratio Pairs Ratio
60 to 300 passengers 27 4.11 131 4.24
301 to 600 passengers 19 4.85 54 4.87
601 to 1500 passengers 18 4.39 53 4.36
1601 to 6000 passengers 28 4.48 29 4.23
In the 60-300 and 301-600 volume groups, where the added competi-
tion was generally incidental to the other purposes of the route struc-
ture change, the segments on which competition was added showed
slower growth than the segments served by a single carrier. Competi-
tion on these routes, with small volume, was especially harmful. The
costs of the competing carrier were added, but no additional revenues
were generated to offset them. In the 601-1500 group, where the added
competition may either have been by design or incidental, the competi-
10 See Appendix III-C.
"See Appendix I.
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tion-added segments grew less than one percent faster. In the 1501-
6000 group, where competition was often added by design in hopes of
greatly stimulating travel, but almost invariably without findings of
inadequacies of existing one-carrier services, the average rate of growth
on segments where competition was added was only 6 percent greater
than on segments without the added competition. Even on these large
segments, therefore, no real increases in travel were generated as an off-
set against the substantially increased costs.
2. Leveling-Off of Air Travel
The tendency of travel to level-off is related to its stage of develop-
ment in the prewar period as reflected in the volume of travel. There-
fore, the tendency for growth to level-off is more pronounced on the
larger segments where'development is most advanced.
Leveling-off of travel on entire routes was in evidence before the
war. This was shown in Civil Aeronautics Board statistics of traffic
growth (passenger miles) on the various routes from September 1940
to September 1941, when average growth-ratio was 135 percent.
Leveled-Off Growth Very Rapid Growth
AAL Route 7-118% BNF Route 9-164%
EAL Route 5-121% EAL Route 6-168%
NWA Route 3-119% CAP Route 14-184%
TWA Route 44-122% WAL Route 13-166%
The great variations in growth shown above resulted from differences
in the stages of development in September 1940. For example, Ameri-
can's Route 7 and Trans-World's Route 44 grew at relatively slow
rates. Both routes lay in the New York-Chicago, Northeastern region,
Route 44 extending to Kansas City. In this region, the previous devel-
opment of competitive and non-competitive travel was intense. All
important segments enjoyed high quality prewar service, and no mate-
rial mileage savings were possible. Travel volume was beginning to
level-off, and therefore grew at a slower rate than it did on segments
that were immature and underdeveloped during prewar periods.
3. Reduction in Mileages
Between many city-pairs, certification of first one-carrier service re-
sulted in substantial reduction of air route mileage, and in most in-
stances this was accompanied by correspondingly reduced fares. Effects
on travel growth are clearly shown in segments listed below:
Average Growth
City-Pairs with First Reduction Passengers Ratio-Postwar
One-Carrier Service in Circuity Prewar Postwar to Prewar
Miami-Cincinnati 11% 72 921 12.8
Miami-Cleveland 15% 143 1,759 12.3
Dallas/Ft. Worth-San Diego 15% 7 210 30.0
New York-Columbia, S. C. 17% ' 12 202 16.8
Dallas/Ft. Worth-Denver 19% 10 462 46.2
Detroit-Indianapolis 24% 67 1,234 18.4
Washington-Syracuse 29% 55 925 16.8
Total 366 5,713 15.6
Average for 155 segments receiving First One-Carrier Service 7.6
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From the foregoing tabulation, it was evident that large reduction
in mileage and fares stimulated the rates of growth.
Between city-pairs, where certification of first one-carrier service re-







Prewar Postwar to Prewar
Boston-Pittsburgh 4% 190 1,102 5.8
New York-Portland, Me. 4% 335 1,961 5.9
Boston-Richmond 3% 29 169 5.8
New York-Birmingham 3% 186 723 3.9
Chicago-Richmond 0% 42 219 5.2
Washington-Kansas City 0% 120 572 4.8
Boston-New Orleans 0% 35 139 4.0
Total 937 4,885 5.2
Average for 155 segments receiving First One-Carrier Service 7.6
It is evident that when mileage reductions were small or nil, ten-
dency of first one-carrier to stimulate growth was much less.
Reduction in mileage has also resulted in greatly increased growth





Los Angeles-New Orleans 7.8% 32
Seattle-Dallas/Ft. Worth 14.2% 8
Chicago-Bristol 29.0% 10
Total 50
Average for 57 Connecting-only Segments
(b) Same One-Carrier Travel
Los Angeles-Oklahoma City 15.5% 34
Los Angeles-Tulsa 15.3% 31
Washington-Tulsa 15.3%* 33
Total 98
Average of 267 Same One-Carrier Segments
(c) Same Competitive
Dallas/Ft. Worth-Chicago 11.1% 421
Average of 18 Same Competitive Segments
* Prewar distance computed via Chicago via AAL.
Average Growth
Passengers Ratio-Postwar






















Thus, the factor of reduced mileage encouraged growth of all types
of travel, and appeared to have been much more important than type
of service.
These examples all pointed to the same general trend, the greater
the reduction in mileage and fares, the greater the growth, irrespective
of type of service.
4. Mileage Between City-Pairs
Classification of city-pairs by postwar mileage ranges, indicated that
mileage between city-pairs had little influence on travel over 1,000
miles as shown by the following:



















This long range travel represented a little less than one-fourth of
the travel sample.
In the ranges below 1,000 miles, which constituted more than three-
fourths of the travel sample, the rates of growth tended to decline as
the distances became less, as clearly shown below:
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Below 1000 miles, competition from railroads became progressively
greater, and the advantages of air transportation became less pro-
nounced; air travel growth was correspondingly retarded.
A detailed breakdown of travel growth at different ranges by types
of service is shown in Appendix II. It will be noted that above 1600
miles connecting-only traffic developed considerably more than any
other type of service.
5. Improvement of Airports
Improved airports at several cities have increased the reliability of
service and encouraged carriers to increase frequency of service and to
schedule flights at better hours. Two such cities on American's system
were Charleston, W. Va., and Scranton-Wilkes Barre, Pa. In both in-
stances, new hilltop airports were developed replacing valley airports.
Results showed:
City-Pairs







ston-Charleston, W. Va. 19 121
ew York-Charleston, W. Va. 93 1,105
ashington-Charleston, W. Va. 104 904
hicago-Scranton/Wilkes Barre 14 167
Total 230 2,297
Average for 92 Segments, Competition Added
City-Pairs





hicago-Charleston, W. Va. 39 552
etroit-Scranton/Wilkes Barre 8 93
Total 47 645

















JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the improved airports at
Charleston and Scranton/Wilkes Barre were far more important in
stimulating travel growth than was type of service. The growth of
both segments was greater than the average for its group. Further-
more, the segments receiving the same one-carrier service improved
more than did those over which competition was added.
6. Absorption of Growth for Adjacent City-Pairs
In some instances high rates of growth resulted from diversion of
growth from adjacent city-pairs. It was a common belief that all air
travel increases were clear gains, but that has not been the case. There
were two kinds of such diversion.
(a) Growth was diverted to segments, which received first one-car-
rier service, from the normal growth of other adjacent segments. This
diversion resulted in some rather large rates of growth, that could not
be credited entirely to the new type service.
City-Pairs Benefiting from Growth Ratio
First One-Carrier Service Postwar to Prewar
New York-Milwaukee Growth 15.33
absorbed part of New York-Chicago Growth 3.09
New York-Bangor Growth 6.20
absorbed part of Boston-Bangor Growth 2.96
New York-Montpelier Growth 15.89
absorbed part of Boston-Montpelier Growth 1.70
The large growth shown for the three segments, which benefited
from first one-carrier service, resulted in part from diversion of growth
from three other segments, whose growth was correspondingly de-
pressed. In 1940, the New York to Chicago travel included passengers
beyond to Milwaukee, connecting by railroad and interurban. Upon
certification of through service, New York to Milwaukee, this traffic
was diverted from the New York-Chicago segment to the New York-
Milwaukee segment. 12 The large growth of travel from New York to
Bangor, and New York to Montpelier, following the extension of
Northeast into New York, resulted from similar diversion of passengers
from Northeast's Boston-Bangor and Boston-Montpelier segments.
Many passengers were shown in prewar surveys of the Civil Aeronau-
tics Board as having originated in Boston.
(b) Certification of service to cities, which had not received service
during the prewar periods, also caused diversion of normal growth seg-
ments.
City-Pairs and Growth Ratio
Character of Diversion Postwar to Prewar
Chicago-Buffalo Growth 3.23
partly absorbed by certification of Chicago
Toronto service over Trans-Canada.
Chicago-Cleveland Growth 2.73
partly absorbed by growth of Chicago-Youngstown
segment.
12 See Transcript Page 79, Volume 2, in North Central Case, CAB Docket
No. 415, et al.
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Washington-Cleveland Growth 3.08
partly absorbed by growth of Washington-Toledo
segment.
New York-Akron Growth 2.56
partly absorbed by growth of New York-Youngstown
segment.
The relatively low rates of growth between these four city-pairs, re-
sulted from loss of traffic generated by nearby cities, which received
service for the first time, postwar. For example, prewar, the air travel
moving from Chicago to Toronto moved via Buffalo and appeared on
the surveys of the Civil Aeronautics Board as Chicago-Buffalo travel.
Following certification of Trans-Canada Airlines between Chicago and
Toronto, the postwar travel was shown as moving between these points.
It was diverted from the Chicago-Buffalo segment.
Authorization of air service to other new cities caused similar diver-
sion. For example:
Topeka has diverted from Kansas City
Terre Haute has diverted from Indianapolis and St. Louis
Lincoln has diverted from Omaha by its greatly improved postwar
service
Toledo has diverted from Detroit as well as Cleveland
Peoria has diverted from Chicago
In most of these instances the proportions of diversion have been small,
yet they nevertheless have been factors contributing to the slower rates
of growth on certain Kansas City, Indianapolis, St. Louis, Omaha, De-
troit and Chicago segments.
7. Growth of International Travel and Shifts in International
Gateways
While this was a study of domestic travel growth in which interna-
tional segments such as New York-Montreal were eliminated, neverthe-
less the domestic portions of international travel were shown as
domestic travel to the gateway city. It was so treated in this survey, be-
cause its deletion would have been extremely difficult.
The postwar shift of the principal gateway cities has affected travel
growth. As an example, the gateway city to Mexico was shifted from
Brownsville to San Antonio. The domestic portion of this interna-
tional travel was formerly included in the, travel to and from Browns-
ville. Postwar it was included in the San Antonio travel. This shift
increased the growth rate of "competition-added" travel at several
mileage ranges, although the traffic growth is not attributable to the
creation of competition.
In the 1201 to 1600 mile range, there was only one such item which
showed postwar travel nearly 16 times that of prewar; the segment was
Washington-San Antonio. If travel between Washington-Monterrey
and Washington-Mexico City had been excluded, the growth-ratio of
this segment would have been only 7.79, or about half.
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
In the 1601-2000 mile range, growth of competition-added travel
was 7.5 times. If New York-Monterrey and New York-Mexico City
had been excluded, the growth would have been 6.67 times. Similarly,
in the 1001-1200 mile range, exclusion of Chicago-Mexico City and
Chicago-Monterrey travel would have reduced the growth ratio from
8.05 to 7.09.
CONCLUSIONS
1. Claims for greatly increased air travel following certification of
"first one-carrier ^ service have not been borne out by a large, unbiased
statistical sample of prewar and postwar travel.
2. Claims for greatly stimulated air travel resulting from competi-
tion have not been borne out.
3. Connecting service has been nearly as effective in developing air
travel as "first one-carrier" service, and has been greatly underrated.
4. No reliance at all can be placed on claims which were based on
samples, biased in their selection of city-pairs.
5. Other factors have influenced growth of air travel much more
than either the addition of competition or certification of "first one-
carrier" service. In making comparisons, these other factors must be
considered; otherwise the comparisons are distorted.
APPENDIX I
Comparative Growth of Postwar and Prewar Air Travel
at Ten Leading Cities as Affected by Type of Service
Classified by Volumes of Travel
City- Passengers Growth Percent ofType of Service Pairs Prewar Postwar Ratio Group Travel
60-300 Passengers
First one carrier 108 2,305 15,549 6.75 25.6%
Connecting only 48 986 5,527 5.61 56.3
Competition added 27 1,219 5,015 4.11 4.2
Same one carrier 131 4,585 19,428 4.24 11.5
Same competitive 2 32 290 9.06 0.9
Total 316 9,127 45,809 5.02 11.8%
301-600 Passengers
First one carrier 19 1,377 8,657 6.29 14.2%
Connecting only 7 304 2,714 8.93 27.6
Competition added 19 1,791 8,693 4.85 7.4
Same one carrier 54 4,662 22,687 4.87 13.4
Same competitive 5 482 2,420 5.02 8.0
Total 104 8,616 45,171 5.24 11.6%
601-1,500 Passengers
First one carrier 20 2,251 18,539 8.24 30.5%
Connecting only 2 166 1,577 9.50 16.1
Competition added 18 3,997 17,560 4.39 14.9
Same one carrier 53 11,311 49,260 4.36 29.2
Same competitive 4 1,178 4,219 3.58 13.9
Total 97 18,903 91,155 4.82 23.5%
1,501-6,000 Passengers
First one carrier 8 2,081 18,030 8.66 29.7%
Connecting only .. ..
Competition added 28 19,407 86,930 4.48 73.6
Same one carrier 29 18,313 77,505 4.23 45.9
Same competitive 7 7,387 23,453 3.17 77.2
Total 72 47,188 205,918 4.36 53.1%
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Aggregate
First one carrier 155 8,014 60,775 7.58 100.0%
Connection only 57 1,456 9,818 6.74 100.0%
Competition added 92 26,414 118,198 4.47 100.0%
Same one carrier 267 38,871 168,880 4.34 100.0%
Same competitive 18 9,079 30,382 3.35 100.0%
Total 589 83,834 388,053 4.63 100.0%
Source: CAB Surveys of Airline Travel for September 1940, March 1941,
September 1948, and March 1949.
APPENDIX II
Comparative Growth of Postwar and Prewar Air Travel
at Ten Leading Cities as Affected by Type of Service
Classified by Distance Between Cities
City- Passengers Growth Percent
Travel Classification Pairs Prewar Postwar Ratio of Travel
1. Over 2,000 miles
First one-carrier 20 842 5,123 6.08
Connecting only 4 104 843 8.11
Competition added 10 2,003 10,442 5.21
Same one carrier 13 525 2,955 5.63
Same competitive 1 10 81 8.10
Total 48 3,484 19,444 5.58 5.01%
2. 1,601-2,000 miles
First one-carrier 13 359 2,999 8.35
Connecting only 10 232 2,4681 10.64
Competition added 7 1,579 11,844 7.50
Same one carrier 16 747 3,297 4.41
Same competitive 4 499 2,128 4.26
Total 50 3,416 22,736 6.66 5.86%
3. 1,201-1,600 miles
First one-carrier 13 603 4,316 7.16
Connecting only 16 396 2,6391 6.66
Competition added 1 33 527 15.97
Same one carrier 27 2,442 13,122 5.37
Same competitive 2 174 1,350 7.76
Total 59 3,648 21,954 6.02 5.66%
4. 1,001-1,200 miles
First one-carrier 16 1,100 9,047 8.22
Connecting only 6 228 1,374 6.03
Competition added 6 493 3,970 8.05
Same one carrier 27 2,575 13,994 5.43
Same competitive .. ... ..... ...
Total 55 4,396 28,385 6.46 7.31%
5. 801-1,000 miles
First one-carrier 19 805 5,564 6.91
Connecting only 10 259 1,046 4.04
Competition added 7 1,346 6,046 4.49
Same one carrier 38 3,465 19,108 5.51
Same competitive 1 966 3,670 3.80
Total 75 6,841 35,434 5.18 9.13%
6. 601-800 miles
First one-carrier 30 1,059 9,2962 8.78
Connecting only 4 74 344 4.65
Competition added 16 2,496 12,653 5.07
Same one carrier 34 3,071 13,906 4.53
Same competitive 3 1,174 5,140 4.38
Total 87 7,874 41,339 5.25 10.65%





















































First one-carrier 155 8,014 60,775 7.58
Connecting only 57 1,456 9,818 6.74
Competition added 92 26,414 118,198 4.47
Same one carrier 267 38,871 168,880 4.34
Same competitive 18 9,079 30,382 3.35
Total 589 83,834 388,053 4.63 100.00%
1 52 percent of connecting only travel in 2nd and 3rd highest ranges.
2 55 percent of first one-carrier travel in these three lowest ranges.
8 61 percent of competition added travel in two lowest ranges.
4 61 percent of same one-carrier travel in two lowest ranges.
5 59 percent of same competitive travel in two lowest ranges.
Source: CAB Surveys of Airline Travel of September 1940, March 1941,
September 1948 and March 1949.
APPENDIX III
Comparative Growth of Postwar and Prewar Air Travel
at Ten Leading Cities as Affected by Type of Service
















Same one carrier 3
Same competitive 3
Total 15
C. City-Pairs with Negative Growth
60-300 Passengers
Connecting only 1








D. City-Pairs- 10 to 20 Percent Competitive
First one carrier 1





* Included Detroit-Cleveland 164 miles by railroad.
Source: CAB Survey of Airline Travel for September 1940,
September 1948 and March 1949.
Total 47 98
B. City-Pairs with More than 6,000 Postwar Passenger
2,434
1,118
126
991
4,669
156,838
24,414
55,892
237,144
79
415
494
681
17,557
18,238
Ratio
Growth
69.54
37.27
42.00
33.03
47.64
3.82
3.77
2.53
3.41
0.78
0.73
0.74
3.23
4.15
4.11
March 1941,
